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Abstract 
 
In this paper we demonstrate that there is a substantial union representation gap in the United 
States.  We arrive at this conclusion by comparing Canadian and American worker responses 
to questions relating to desired union representation.  We find that a majority of the gap in 
union density between Canada and the US is a function of greater frustrated demand on the 
part of American workers.  We then estimate potential union density rates for the United 
States and Canada and find that, given current levels of union membership in both countries, 
if effective demand for unionisation among non-union workers were realised, then this would 
imply equivalently higher rates of unionisation (37 and 36 percent in the US and Canada 
respectively).  These results cast some doubt on the view that even minor reforms to labour 
legislation in the US, to bring them in line with those in most Canadian jurisdictions, would 
do nothing to improve the rate of organising success in the United States.  The results also 
have implications for countries such as Britain who have recently moved closer to a Wagner-
Act model of statutory recognition. 
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 1. Introduction 
 
“Tastes neither change capriciously nor differ importantly between people.  On 
this interpretation…the economist continues to search for differences in 
[constraints] to explain differences or changes in behaviour.”  Stigler and Becker 
(1977). 
 
This paper employs a model of supply and demand for union representation in an attempt to 
better understand why union density in the United States is less than half of that in Canada; a 
country comparable in many respects, with similar collective bargaining laws and which in 
the mid sixties had a similar rate of unionisation.  In our model we assume, in the spirit of 
neo-classical economic theory, that employees in the United States are much like their 
neighbours north of the border, what differentiates them are the constraints they face.  In our 
model, however, we take constraints to mean not only differing material conditions (e.g., 
unemployment rates, income levels, industrial mix etc.,) but also deep-seeded value systems, 
which give rise to differing institutions, laws and their enforcement.  
By controlling for differing constraints and by applying the similar-taste view of 
consumer theory to the question of union density differentials, we arrive at a rather intriguing 
implication: that preferences for union representation at the workplace should be the same in 
both countries.  Given our assumption of homogeneous preferences, the divergence in union 
density between the United States and Canada can be explained by either greater frustrated 
demand for unionisation in the U.S. (under-representation), or, greater numbers of 
dissatisfied unionised workers in Canada (over-representation).  Put simply, if workers have 
the same underlying preferences, then at present ‘someone isn’t getting what they want.’  
Three testable propositions emerge from our model of supply and demand for 
unionisation.  The first proposition builds on the notion that because of differing legal 
regimes, it should be more costly for US employees to gain representation at the workplace 
and more costly for Canadian workers to opt out of unionised environments.  This 
assumption is fairly tenable given what we know about the American and Canadian versions 
of statutory recognition.  In the US nearly 40 percent of American workers are covered by 
right to work laws; which forbid unions from signing collective agreements compelling all 
workers covered to pay dues.  In Canada, on the other hand, a ‘quasi’ closed shop rule is 
operative in all ten provinces.  This essentially prohibits individual workers from opting out 
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of the payment of union dues and hence, ensures (de facto) union membership for all 
employees working in unionised environments.1  Given this small, yet crucial legal 
difference, one should therefore observe greater levels of frustrated demand for unionisation 
among non-unionised workers in the US and greater levels of dissatisfaction among 
unionised workers in Canada.  Secondly, if opposition to union organising and legal 
impediments are greater in the US than in Canada (as is commonly assumed) then a majority 
of the density differential can be ascribed to supply side constraints south of the border.  
Finally, if one were to construct a potential ‘market demand’ for unionisation given data on 
actual union density and voting intentions of union and non-union workers, then levels of 
union density should be statistically similar in both countries. 
 
 
2.  The Supply and Demand Framework of Union Representation  
 
A useful framework for analysing and testing our three propositions is the supply and demand 
framework of collective representation (see Farber and Krueger, 1993; Riddell 1993; Abowd 
and Farber, 1982).  In this model workers may prefer to be unionised, but for various reasons, 
they are not.  Following Riddell (1993), let zi represent the difference between the expected 
utility of any job (union or non-union) for individual i.  The utility loss or gain, which is 
unobserved, is dependent on a host of variables (Xi) such as differences in working 
conditions, job security and the wage differential between otherwise similar union and non-
union jobs. 
 
zi = X i b + Mi  (1) 
 
If we let Di be a dichotomous variable taking on the value 1 for individuals who would prefer 
to belong to a union, and hence prefer unionisation, and zero for those who do not, then, 
 
Pr(Di = 1) = Pr(z>0) = Pr(ui >- X ib). (2) 
 
                                                 
1 Legally workers are free to have their names stricken from union membership lists, but since this will not 
affect the payment of dues there is little reason to do so.  One can think of the Canadian system (where not all 
workers are covered, but those that are have to pay dues) as the opposite of the French and German systems 
where most everyone is granted coverage, but no one is compelled to pay dues or join the union. 
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Now let Ui=1 for individuals who are unionised and Ui=0 for non-union workers.  If one 
assumes - as neo-classical labour economists often do - that labour markets are in 
equilibrium, then individuals have sorted themselves into the jobs of their choice.  If this is 
so, then it would be the case that 
 
Pr(Ui =1) = Pr(z>0) = Pr(ui >- X ib). (3) 
 
This equation implies that the factors determining the demand for unionisation could be 
estimated using information on union status alone. 
However, there are several reasons why unions do not necessarily represent all 
individuals who prefer to be in a union job.  One of the most obvious reasons relates to the 
costs of organising a union for an individual worker.  If employers actively oppose unionising 
attempts, then from an employee’s perspective, the costs of unionising may outweigh the 
benefits.  Thus, even if a majority of current workers in a workplace prefer or would vote for 
unionisation, they may remain non-unionised as a result of organising costs. 
The ‘total’ demand for union jobs is therefore defined by the fraction of workers who 
are either union members and who would remain so if a vote were held, or if non-union, who 
would vote for unionisation at their workplace.  The supply of union jobs relative to demand 
is measured by the fraction of workers who are union members compared to those demanding 
union representation.  If there were no queues for union jobs, the fraction would be one.  To 
the extent that there are non-union workers who prefer union representation, this fraction will 
be less than one.  The fraction of individuals in the non-union sector (Ui=0) who would vote 
for unionisation at their workplace (Di=1) therefore constitutes a measure of “frustrated 
demand” (or an inverse measure of relative supply).  
These two components can be more formally specified.  Following Farber and 
Krueger (1993), the probability that a worker is unionised is given by  
 
Pr(U=1) = Pr (D=1) – Pr(D=1, U=0). (4) 
 
The first term on the left hand side is the desire for unionisation among union and non-union 
workers and therefore represents the demand for union representation.  The second term 
represents frustrated demand.  The probability that a worker is unionised, therefore, is equal 
to the probability that he/she desires union representation minus the probability that the 
worker desires union representation but is not working in a unionised job.  
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3. Formalising Three Testable Hypotheses 
 
The demand and supply framework is useful in evaluating competing explanations for the 
difference in unionisation rates between Canada and the US.  Taking the case of the 
Canada/US difference in the probability of unionisation, an equation analogous to (4) can be 
specified, 
 
Pr(Uc=1) – Pr(Ua=1) = [Pr(Dc=1) – Pr(Da=1)]  
– [ Pr(Dc=1,Uc=0) – Pr(Da=1, Ua=0) ], (5) 
 
where the subscript c refers to Canada and the subscript a refers to the US.  The term in the 
first brackets measures the difference in demand for unionisation between Canada and the 
US.  The term in the second brackets measures differences in frustrated demand.  Based on 
(5) we can now test our first proposition (formalised below), by comparing levels of 
frustrated demand in both countries. 
 
Proposition 1a:  Given a higher rate of unionisation in Canada and our assumption of similar 
preferences for union representation, there should be more frustrated demand (less supply) 
for unionisation south of the border.  That is, there are relatively more non-union workers in 
the US than in Canada who would prefer to be in a unionised workplace but who are not 
currently being represented.  
 
Proposition 1b:  Given a higher rate of unionisation in Canada and our assumption of similar 
preferences for union representation, there should be more frustrated union members north of 
the border.  That is, there are relatively more union workers in Canada than in the US who 
would prefer not to be unionised but who are currently being represented.  
 
If we take the difference in unionisation rates across both countries in 1996 - the term 
on the left hand side of (5) - and decompose it into differences associated with the desire for 
unionisation (demand) versus differences in relative supply (frustrated demand) then we can 
provide an estimate for the first and second terms on the right hand side of (5).  Once again, 
based on (5) our second testable proposition can now be formalized: 
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Proposition 2:  Given our assumption of greater levels of opposition to unions in the US than 
in Canada, if one were to decompose the difference in union density between the two 
countries according to supply and demand factors, a majority of the density differential can 
be ascribed to supply side constraints. 
 
Clearly, if we find evidence of a supply side constraint in the US, then the idea of a 
hypothetical level of union density that would be more or less equal in both countries, 
emerges.  As a consequence our third proposition is the following: 
 
Proposition 3:  If one were to construct a potential ‘market demand’ for unionisation - given 
data on actual union density and voting intentions of union and non-union workers combined 
with similar preferences and greater frustrated demand for unionisation in the US than in 
Canada - then levels of union density should be statistically similar in both countries. 
 
Such a proposition can easily be tested by simply constructing a hypothetical union 
density rate based on the following equation: 
 
(U*=1) = [Pr(U=1)*Pr (D=1 êU=1) ] + [Pr(U=0)*(D=1 êU=1)] (6) 
 
where U* is potential union demand as a function of the proportion of existing union 
members who would prefer to remain unionised (first term in brackets) plus the proportion of 
non-union workers who would vote to become unionised (the second term in brackets). 
 
 
4. Results:  Decomposing the US-Canada Union Density Differential 
 
The data for this paper are drawn from a 1996 Angus Reid survey conducted for Seymour 
Martin Lipset and Noah Meltz, covering a total of 3,176 respondents:  1,681 in the US and 
1,495 in Canada.  A summary of this data can be found in Lipset and Meltz (1997).  
At the time of the survey the probability that a Canadian employee was unionised was 
more than double that of an American worker (0.34 versus 0.15).  Our measure of demand for 
unionisation is based on a question that asked our sample of employed workers (union/non-
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union) to state whether they would ‘prefer to belong/remain in’ a union.  Table 1 presents the 
results of our demand/supply framework. 
 
4.1 There is greater frustrated demand for unionisation in the US than in Canada 
 
In accounting for the union density gap, an important factor does seem to be greater frustrated 
demand for unionisation south of the border (0.31 in the US versus 0.22 in Canada).  Our 
results also confirm that by far the greatest difference between the US and Canada is the 
greater supply of unionisation conditional on a worker’s desire for union membership; (see 
row 5 Table 1).  That is, a Canadian worker who desires union representation has a far greater 
chance (137 percent higher) of being unionised than an American worker who desires the 
same representation.  These statistics indicate that Canada’s greater union density is due to 
greater supply of union coverage than in the US. 
 
4.2 There is a greater desire for ‘free-ridership’ in Canada than in the US 
 
As expected there are more ‘frustrated’ union members in Canada than in the US.  The 
probability that a Canadian union member prefers to remain in a union is 12 percent less than 
a comparable American worker (see row 3 in Table 1).  This, as mentioned above, likely 
reflects differences in collective bargaining legislation in the two countries and the greater 
enforcement of labour legislation in Canada (Meltz 1985; Bruce, 1989).  For example more 
than 20 states in the US have right to work laws that outlaw union shop agreements where 
every employee covered by a collective agreement has to belong to a union.  In most 
Canadian jurisdictions it is the reverse:  at the request of a union, collective agreements can 
require payment of dues by all employees (no free-riding).  This is known as the Rand 
Formula, a compromise recommended by Justice Ivan Rand in 1946 to settle the strike by the 
UAW at Ford of Canada (Taras and Ponak, 2001).  
 
4.3 Supply side constraints are the greatest cause of the Canada/US density 
differential 
 
In order to assess the relative importance of demand and supply factors, the gap in union 
density can be decomposed using (5).  In 1996, the difference in union density between 
Canada and the US in BLS and LFS data was 19 points (34 percent-15 percent).  Using our 
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estimate of Pr (D=1êU=0), then Pr (Dc=1,Uc=0) = .22(1 - 0.34) = .15.  The corresponding 
figure for the US is Pr (Da=1,Ua=0) = .31(1 - 0.15) = .27.  Therefore, 12 points, of the 18-
point gap in union density between Canada and the US, is attributable to less relative supply.  
The remaining difference (6 points) is due to greater demand for unionisation north of the 
border.  Therefore, a full 67 percent of the Canada-US difference in union density is 
accounted for by supply-side factors, while only 33 percent is attributable to demand side 
differences.  This result is in line with Riddell (1993) and Freeman and Rogers (1999).  
 
4.4. The potential level of unionisation in both countries should be the same 
 
In terms of desired representation, we find that potential levels of union membership are 
nearly identical in both countries (see row 2 Table 1).  This result is slightly at odds with 
previous estimates by both Riddell (1993) and Farber and Krueger (1993) that pointed to 
greater demand for unionisation in Canada than the US.  This, however, was due to the fact 
that ‘dissatisfied union members’ were not taken into account and so observed density was 
used as an indicator of desired representation.  The reason for the upward bias in Canada is 
also partly attributable to the fact that previous studies were working with separate Canada-
US data sets and differently worded questions.  Whereas the US question in the Riddell and 
Farber and Krueger studies was similar to our own survey, the Canadian question was 
slightly more ambiguous.2  
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we began with an assumption borrowed from an often cited but controversial 
paper, in which consumer preferences were treated “…as stable over time and similar among 
people”(Stigler and Becker, 1977:76).  Based on this interpretation of consumer preferences 
and applying it to the question of why America’s union density is less than half the level of 
                                                 
2 In the earlier studies, union members were assumed to have D=1 for all.  In our study we factored in the 
dissatisfied members.  In addition, the Canadian question read “Thinking about your own needs, and your 
current employment situation and expectations, would you say that it is very likely, somewhat likely, not very 
likely, or not likely at all that you would consider joining or associating yourself with a union or professional 
association in the future?”  
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that in Canada, we produced three testable propositions.  In each case our propositions were 
confirmed.  We found the following: 
 
· there is greater frustrated demand for unionisation in the US (substantial under-
representation) than in Canada and there is greater dissatisfaction among Canadian union 
members (some over-representation) although less important in relative terms than the 
representation gap (Towers, 1997) among non-union members in the US. 
· a full 67 percent of the 18-point gap in union density between Canada and the US at the 
time of the survey, could be accounted for by unsatisfied demand (supply-side 
constraints).  That is, a Canadian worker who desires union representation has a far 
greater chance (137 percent higher) of being unionised than an American worker who 
desires the same representation. 
· given data on actual union density and voting intentions of union and non-union workers, 
potential levels of union density are higher than presently observed (4 and 23 points 
higher in Canada and the US respectively) and nearly identical in both countries. 
 
We consider these results as direct confirmation that workers, at least in terms of 
preferences for representation at the workplace, are similar across borders and conform to the 
‘naïve’ model of consumer choice.  In both countries two-fifths of the population desire 
representation.  In Canada 90 percent of those desiring representation are covered whereas in 
the US only 39 percent receive the same representation.  We interpret these results as 
providing powerful, albeit indirect, confirmation that the legal environment and employer 
resistance pose greater obstacles to union organizing in the US than in Canada.  We also feel, 
that deeper constraints, located in the value systems of both countries, may hold the key to 
understand why preferences for unionisation are not being realized south of the border.  As a 
subject of future research it may be useful to construct models where the desire for 
unionisation is seen as an individual ‘search cost’, which requires some knowledge that has to 
be obtained (perhaps knowledge about whom to contact and/or how to circumvent employer 
obstacles) in order for worker preferences (frustrated demand) to become realized.  
 9
Table 1:  Canada-US Comparison of Union Preferences:  Based on the question “All 
things considered, if you had a choice, would you personally prefer to belong to (remain 
in) a labour union or not?” 
 
Canada US  
n=938 n=1159 
Probabilities   
Pr(U=1) .34 .15 
Pr (U*=1) .36 .37 
Pr (D=1êU=0) .22 .31 
Pr (D=1êU=1) .65 .77 
Pr (U=1êD=1) .97 .44 
Pr (D=1,U=0) .14 .26 
 
Definitions: 
Pr (U=1):  The probability that a worker is a union member.  The percentages above are 
drawn from BLS and LFS estimates of union density.  Pr(Uc=1) = .34  and Pr(Ua=1) = .15. 
 
Pr(U*=1):  Hypothetical level of union density or the probability that a worker desires and 
receives union representation.  This is the sum of the probability that a worker is a union 
member and desires to retain union membership plus the probability that worker desires 
union representation but is not employed on a union job (union membership plus frustrated 
demand).  Formally, this is Pr (D=1êU=1)*Pr(U=1) + Pr (D=1, U=0). 
 
Pr (D=1êU=0):  The probability that a non-union worker demands union representation.  
Computed from tabulations of the 1996 Angus Reid survey from the following question 
“Would you prefer to belong to a union or not?”  Individuals who responded yes were coded 
D=1. 
 
Pr (D=1êU=1):  The probability that a union worker demands union representation.  
Computed from tabulations of the 1996 Angus Reid survey from the following question 
“Would you prefer to remain in a union or not?”  Individuals who responded yes were coded 
D=1. 
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Pr (U=1êD=1):  The probability of being unionised conditional on the desire to be unionised.  
This represents the ease of obtaining a union job given that a worker desires a union job.  
Riddell (1993) interprets this as a measure of relative supply. 
 
Pr(D=1,U=0):  The probability that a worker demands union representation but is not 
employed on a union job (frustrated demand).  Computed as Pr (D=1êU=0)*Pr(U=0).  
(D=1êU=0) was obtained from this table but Pr(U=0) is obtained from BLS and LFS 
estimates of union density.  Pr(Uc=1) = .34  and Pr(Ua=1) = .15. 
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